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In  recent  years  an  increasingly  common  feature  in  international  trade  is  cases  where  an 
importing country finds production practices in exporting countries unacceptable, and where 
one  seeks  to  change  these  practices  by  imposing  trade  restrictions.  Examples  include 
unacceptable environmental practices, anti-dumping, child labour and social dumping. Trade 
measures implemented to influence such practices depend on the importer’s degree of market 
power to be effective. In particular, they will have no effect if the importing country does not 
have oligopsony power. We derive a residual supply schedule to investigate the degree of 
oligopsony power in an international trade setting. This allows a test of whether the measures 
will have an impact before they are implemented. An empirical application is provided for 
U.S. swordfish imports, and the results indicate that the U.S. has market power against three 
of the six countries investigated. 
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When will trade restrictions affect producer behavior: 
Oligopsony power in international trade 
 
Introduction 
In  recent  years  an  increasingly  common  feature  in  international  trade  is  cases  where  an 
importing country finds production practices in exporting countries unacceptable, and where 
one seeks to change these practices by imposing trade restrictions. One example why import 
restrictions are implemented is environmental concerns, such as the US dolphin and turtle safe 
cases.
1 The US now requires that imported tuna and shrimp must be harvested with dolphin-
safe  and  turtle-safe  devices,  respectively,  for  exporters  to  have  access  to  the  US  market. 
However,  these  measures  will  only  change  the  fishermen’s  behavior  and  have  a  positive 
environmental effect if the US influences the traded prices of wild-caught shrimp and tuna. If 
the fishermen can shift their product to other markets, the import restrictions will have little or 
no  effect.  Hence,  the  exporter  will  not  undertake  costly  behavioral  changes  unless  given 
adequate economic incentives. In practice this means that the effectiveness of trade restricting 
measures in improving production practices in exporting countries depends on the importer’s 
capability of reducing the exporters’ profitability. Effective trade measures to change exporter 
behavior thus require that the importer has oligopsony power with respect to the exporter. 
This  also  implies  that  the  potential  effect  of  trade  measures  can  be  tested  before 




In addition to environmental concerns, there are also several other reasons why imports are 
restricted due to unacceptable production practices. During recent decades, there has been an  
                                                 
1 More information about these cases can be found in Wessells and Wallström (1994), Robb (2001), and Teisl, 




increase in anti-dumping cases where named exporters, when found guilty, have had to pay an 
anti-dumping  duty  to  access  the  market  (Prusa,  1996).  The  main  goal  of  the  dumping 
measures is to raise prices in the domestic market to a “fair” level. Whether there is a price 
effect  due  to  the  measures,  however,  depends  on  whether  the  country  that  imposes  the 
restrictions has market power against the group of named producers. If not, the main effect of 
the measures will be a reallocation of trade patterns, as has been the case for US import 
restrictions  on  salmon  and  shrimp  (Asche,  2001;  Keithly  and  Poudel,  2008).  Import 
restrictions have been implemented to stop the use of child labor, which is a case of so-called 
social dumping, and in war financing as with dirty diamonds. Austvik (1997) indicates that 
increased energy taxes among importers of oil have the potential to transfer resource rent 
from producer to consumer countries. The common feature of these measures is that if an 
importer does not have oligopsony power, there is no reason to believe the measures will have 
any effect. 
 
In  his  seminal  paper,  Lerner  (1934)  related  the  firm’s  market  power  to  the  slope  of  the 
demand schedule facing the individual firm, the residual demand curve. Goldberg and Knetter 
(1999) show how this can be used to investigate whether an exporting country has market 
power.
2 They also show that an advantage in the international trade setting is that exchange 
rates will provide powerful instruments. To measure the degree of oligopsony power for a 
country we use a similar notion; the residual supply schedule. In section 2 we derive the 
residual supply curve in an international trade context formally, largely following Goldberg 
and Knetter (1999). Our model is related to Durham and Sexton’s (1992) model of a residual 
supply curve for an individual firm in a similar way as Goldberg and Knetter’s (1999) model 
is related to Baker and Bresnahan (1988). The main difference is how variables related to 
                                                 
2 Exploitation of market power on a country basis in international trade is known as Pricing-to-market (PTM) 




international trade,  and  particularly  exchange  rates and the possibility to trade with other 
countries are included.  
 
A graphical representation is a useful starting point. The residual supply curve that faces an 
importing country depicts how a country influences the input price through the quantity it 
purchases. To derive the residual supply we have to take into account the total supply and the 
derived demand of all other importers of the product. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The left 
panel shows the total market supply, S, and the derived demand from all other countries 
buying the product in question, Dother. The residual supply Sresidual shown in the right panel is 
then given by the difference between market supply and other firms’ derived demand. The 
elasticity  of  the  residual  supply  curve  depends  both  on  the  market  supply  and  the  other 
countries’ derived demand. With competitive demand for the product, the price is completely 
determined by the other countries’ derived demand. In this case, the residual supply curve will 
be flat, and an import restriction will not have any effect on the price to the exporter. An 
upward-sloping supply curve implies that the country of interest has some oligopsony power.
3 
If the  country will maximize profits, for instance to obtain  a maximum rent transfer, the 
country can act as a monopsonist on the marginal expenditure curve (ME), giving the price 
P*. When the residual supply curve and the market supply curve coincide, i.e., have the same 
slope, the country will be a monopsonist. Also for an oligopsonist the degree of market power 
can be measured by a Lerner type of index. 
 
An interesting result immediately evident from the figures is that if the suppliers are perfectly 
competitive,  there  is  no  scope  to  exploit  oligopsony  power.  This  is  because  a  horizontal 
                                                 
3 Note that this does not imply that individual importers in the importing country have oligopsony power. It is 
changes in aggregate imports that influence the exporter’s price. As a result, this can be exploited by introducing 
trade measures that serve to ‘coordinate’ the importers in reducing the quantity imported. Trade measures as a 




market supply schedule also gives a flat residual supply curve. Because strong competition 
leads to a responsive supply, it is more likely with a highly elastic supply than a highly elastic 
aggregate consumer demand.
4 Consequently there are fewer opportunities to exploit market 
power for a buyer than for a seller. Many internationally traded commodities, for example, are 
characterized  by  competitive  supply,  at  least  within  regions.  This  is  particularly  true  in 





Figure 1. Market Supply and Residual Supply of Intermediate Good M 
 
  
To test for oligopsony power, a residual supply schedule provides a single equation that can 
be  easily  estimated  when  given  a  functional  form.  This  provides  a  different  approach  to 
testing for oligopsony power than the specifications of Schroeter (1988) and Morrison Paul 
                                                 
4 Diminishing marginal utility and budget constraints make consumer demand for all products downward sloping 
and accordingly provide an opportunity for a seller to exploit market power. Hence, while it suffices to face 
limited competition in the sale to exploit market power for a seller, buyer power requires both limited 
competition from other buyers and an upward sloping supply schedule from the providers of the product in 
question. This also increase the scope for exploiting buyer power in the short run, as quasi-fixed input factors 




(2001), who specified the markup equation together with a full cost function specification 
similar to the approach of Appelbaum (1981). Schroeter, Azzam and Zhang (2000) used the 
model of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). The fact that a residual supply schedule can be 
estimated as a single equation linear in its parameters will in many cases make it an easier 
specification to use in empirical work. The specification is independent of the assumptions 
about  market  structures  in  other  markets,  and  any  behavior  on  the  buyer  side  from  a 
competitive  situation  to  a  monopsony  can  be  identified.  Moreover,  the  inputs  can  be 
differentiated, a feature that can be important in international trade as many products are 
differentiated by origin. Finally, estimating the residual supply curve does not require the 
conduct parameters to be estimated, and one accordingly avoids the issues addressed by Corts 
(1999). 
 
We will estimate residual supply equations for leading exporters of swordfish to the USA. 
There  have  been  campaigns  against  current  management  practices  that  may  well  lead  to 
swordfish being the next seafood species for which imports to the US are conditional on the 
fishing practices of the  supplier. The adoption  of ‘cleaner’  catch technology in  exporting 
countries can be costly and difficult to implement (Hogan, 2004). As a result, some kind of 
economic support or sanction scheme must be used to induce the desired behavioral changes. 
We test whether the US has market power over the imports of swordfish from Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. This is accordingly an example of a 
test  of  whether  import  regulations  are  effective  as  a  means  to  improve  environmental 
conditions  in  a  foreign  country.  This  will  be  the  case  only  if  the  importing  country  has 
oligopsony power in its imports of the product. Our results show that the US has oligopsony 
power relative to some of these trading partners, but not in the relationships with Brazil and 




will merely reallocate swordfish exports to other markets if the US imposes environmental 




In this section we derive a model for a particular country’s residual supply, which is the basic 
tool used here to investigate buyer power. Durham and Sexton (1992) derived a residual 
supply model for the homogenous product tomatoes, where different spatial locations were 
the potential source of market power. Our model therefore also has elements from Baker and 
Bresnahan’s  (1988)  model  of  residual  demand,  and  allows  the  input  factors  to  be 
differentiated. The adoptions necessary to account for the international trade situations are 
similar to those employed by Goldberg and Knetter (1999) when deriving a residual demand 
curve in similar circumstances.  
 
The  inverse  supply  function  for  an  exporter  (or  intermediate  good  M)  facing  importing 
country 1, the country of interest, is 
) , ,... , ( 2
s
n
im im im V w w Q W w = .              (1) 
where  w
im  and  Q
im  are  country  1’s  import  price  in  the  exporter’s  currency  and  quantity, 
w
2,…w
n is a vector of import prices to other countries of the good in the exporters’ currencies, 
and V
s is a vector of exogenous variables entering the supply equation, typically the supplier’s 
input prices in the exporter’s currency. Correspondingly, we can formulate the inverse supply 
facing each of the other importers of good M, i = 2,…,N, as  
) , , , (




Goldberg and Knetter (1999) provide a discussion of how the export industry’s first order 
conditions can be derived for a specific firm. A similar procedure is used here. As the object 
of  interest  is  the  import  demand  of  a  country,  one  can,  by  assuming  the  appropriate 
aggregation conditions are fulfilled, just pose the importer’s problem. For every exporter, 
import demand for the good can be found by solving the profit maximizing problem: 
  erz Q w z Q epf Max
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where e is the exchange rate, p is the importer’s sales price of the good in domestic currency, 
f(·) is the production function, z is a vector of quantities of other input factors (e.g. marketing 
costs) and r their prices in the domestic currency. The first order conditions imply that the 
marginal revenue product (MRP) is set equal to the perceived marginal expenditure (PME). 
The MRP shows the additional value that the importing country attach to a marginal increase 
in import of the product, and is found by taking the derivative of the first term on the right 
hand side of (3) with respect to the imported quantity, Q
im. Likewise, the PME shows the 
additional  outlay  following  a  marginal  increase  in  imports,  and  is  found  by  taking  the 
derivative of the second term on the right hand side. Since PME depends on the importing 
country’s conjectures concerning the response from other importers, it is perceived, rather 





























Q MRP e w .          (4) 
The degree of market power is determined by the last parenthesis, which is often denoted by a 
conduct parameter l
im. The conduct parameter l
im shows the conjectures about the impact on 
other countries’ import prices of increased demand from the country of interest, 
j im W Q ¶ ¶ . 






























Q r p MRP e w ) , ( ,       (5) 
for i = 1,…,K. Solving the equations defined by (2) and (4), one obtains the import prices in 
the  competing  import  countries  as  functions  of  the  supply  and  demand  shifters,  and  the 
imported quantity. Using vectors notation, this is given as 
) , , , , (
I s im I i eP eR V Q E w l = ,             (6)  
where E
I is the equilibrium quantity for all markets except for the market of interest, and all 
right-hand side variables but Q
im are exogenous. Equation (6) can therefore be denoted as a 
partially reduced form. 
 
By substituting from equation (6) into (1), one obtains the residual supply relationship facing 
the country of interest 
) ), , , R , , ( , (
s I s im I im im im V eP e V Q E Q W w l = .          (7) 
Substituting out the redundancies, this gives the residual supply curve facing the country of 
interest. 
) ; , R , , (
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The residual supply curve is a function of the demanded quantity of the import good, the 
supply shifters V
s, and the demand shifters for other countries buying the good, which are 
divided into their sales price eP and the price for their input factors eR. The output price, 
other input factor prices and the exchange rate for the import country are not included in this 
equation and will serve as instruments for the endogenous quantity Q
im.  
 
The key parameter of interest is the inverse residual supply elasticity, or the residual supply 











= k .                   (9) 
This elasticity will be zero if the demanded quantity of from the import country does not 
influence the import price and the importing country does not have any market power. The 
elasticity increases in magnitude as the market power of the importing country increases.  
 
As the model is formulated at the country level one can, of course, provide criteria that give 
consistent aggregation as in Appelbaum (1982), or one can interpret the estimated parameters 
as industry averages as in Goldberg and Knetter (1999). In this, Golberg and Knetter (1999) 
are typical representatives of the Pricing-To-Market literature, where exporting and importing 
countries are the unit of analysis. In general when using aggregated data, little focus is given 
to whether the aggregation criterion is met. What matters in relation to trade policy is that 
trade measures can be interpreted as coordinated actions by the importing firms in a country. 
This also applies in the case of import measures, as these are typically levied on all exporters 
from a given country. We will not elaborate further on this issue here, but only note that the 
models can be used on aggregate data to test whether groups of firms have market power if 
one is willing to assume that an aggregation criterion holds or to make interpretations based 
directly on the aggregated data.  
 
As noted by Goldberg and Knetter (1999), there is, in general, substantially more variation in 
the exchange  rates than in factor prices and other cost variables and this is also true for 
variables influencing revenue. With functional forms like a double log, where it is reasonable 
to separate the exchange rates from the prices, the exchange rates may provide a very good 
indicator of changes in marginal costs or import demand even if input price data are not 




modeling the supply as a trade allocation.
5 If so, all supply variables can be obtained from the 
exporter country’s trade statistics. 
 
Measuring the degree of market power 
When investigating the degree of market power for a monopolist or oligopsonist, a Lerner 
index  is  the  most  common  measure.  Similar  measures  are  equally  useful  to  measure  the 
degree of monopsony or oligopsony power. Let the import industry in a country be able to 
exercise market power for an imported intermediate product m. For simplicity we assume that 
the firms use the intermediate good in the production of one output only. With the production 
function f(x1, x2, .., xn,), where the imported product m is one of the inputs, the degree of 
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where h is the supply elasticity faced by the importing country, p is the output price and wm is 
the input price for input m. The markdown is here decided by how much lower than the 
marginal value product of the factor the factor price wm is. If the country’s importing firms 
face an infinitely elastic supply curve, the difference between the marginal value product, 
m epf , for factor m and its price is zero. Moreover, as the supply elasticity decreases, the 
difference between the marginal value product and the price increases as the price is reduced 
relative to the marginal value product. 
 
For an oligopsonist, there are two different ways to express the degree of market power using 
this index. In the first, the oligopsonist’s degree of market power is expressed as a function of 
                                                 




the total supply elasticity and a conduct parameter measuring the degree of competition the 









,               (11) 
where q1 is the conduct parameter that indicates the degree of competition among buyers. 
Alternatively, since the oligopsonists will operate as a monopsonist on the residual supply 









,             (12) 
where K is the residual supply elasticity and k is the inverse residual supply elasticity defined 
in equation (9). 
 
Another way to derive the inverse residual supply elasticity is by differentiating equation (8) 
with respect to importing country 1’s quantity Q1. This shows that the inverse residual supply 
elasticity can be formulated as a sum of elasticities that consist of direct and indirect effects 







































k .      (13) 
The  first  term  on  the  right-hand  side  is  the  supply  elasticity,  1 1 ln ln Q S ¶ ¶ .  The  two 
remaining  terms  sum  the  effects  of  strategic  interaction  with  firms  in  other  importing 
countries,  N i ,..., 1 = . The term  1 ln ln Q Wi ¶ ¶  represents the change in prices paid by other 
importing countries as a result of importing country 1’s increased purchases. This term is 
positive when firms in the different countries compete in purchases of the intermediate good 
and otherwise zero. Competition will reduce the supply facing importing country 1 through a 




importing country 1 when firms there offer higher prices. Consequently, the residual supply 
curve will become flatter with increasing intensity of competition among importers.  
 
In the case of residual demand, Baker and Bresnahan (1988) show that the residual demand 
elasticity provides an exact measure of the markup if the conjectures are consistent. This is 
the case also in an oligopsony. Hence, the residual supply elasticity provides an exact measure 
of the markdown if the importing country’s conjectures about the responses of firms in other 
importing countries are consistent. In particular, this is the case if purchases of the factor are 
competitive, as the term  1 ln ln Q Wi ¶ ¶  is then zero. A test of whether the residual supply 
elasticity is zero is always a valid test of whether importing country 1 has market power. In 
other cases, one will expect a steeper residual supply curve to indicate more market power 
also in cases when conjectures are not consistent.  
 
Background and Data 
During the last decades the production process for imported goods have received increased 
attention in the US and Europe. There are also several cases where imports are restricted 
because the production processes in the foreign country are regarded as unacceptable. The 
process that leads to import restrictions is usually started by some interest group pointing at 
the problematic practice. If the concern has a wider appeal, increased support can lead to 
political motions to address the issue. Two environmental concerns that have been addressed 
this way in the US, and where import restrictions have been implemented, are the dolphin safe 
tuna (Wessells and Wallström, 1994; Teisl, Roe and Hicks, 2002) and the turtle safe shrimp 





More recently, there have been initiatives in the US to reduce imports of swordfish because of 
poor environmental practices in many swordfish fisheries. Initiated in 1998, Give Swordfish a 
Break
6  was  a  public  relations  campaign  of  SeaWeb  and  the  National  Resources  Defense 
Council in the US targeting chefs and consumers to refrain from buying swordfish to support 
stronger swordfish conservation.  The first phase lasted until August 2000 when (a temporary) 
victory was declared when the US government supported stronger harvest quota restrictions 
among member nations of the International Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT). However, after a short period of lower activity, campaigning continued, and WWF 
claims that some trawlers catch three metric tones of shark for each metric ton of swordfish.  
 
The US is the world’s largest importer of swordfish, and the US imports make up over 40% of 
global imports of fresh swordfish (FAO Fishstat). The other main import markets are Japan 
and Spain. The swordfish market is segmented as indicated by Figure 2, where the export 
prices for six large exporters are shown. As one can see, price levels differ substantially 
indicating different qualities. Moreover, as fresh swordfish is a highly perishable product, the 
fish is mostly air freighted and transportation costs are also significant.  
 
We  will  investigate  the  potential  market  power  of  the  US  vis-à-vis  six  large  exporters; 
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago. These countries are the 
largest  exporters  which  consistently  ship  to  the  US  (a  few  missing  observations  are 
interpolated). Other significant exporters in some years, like Australia, Canada and Taiwan, 
are virtually not shipping to the US in other years. Hence, although quantities from these 
countries in periods are significant, the US potential to exploit market power is highly limited, 
as these countries have alternative markets.  
                                                 





Quarterly data on import quantity and price for fresh swordfish are obtained from NOAA 
Fisheries’ trade statistics. The data span the period 1996 to 2004. These are the main variables 
of interest in our model. As export supply shifters we use measures that proxy vessel fuel 
costs, swordfish biomass and wage costs. Gasoil price is used as measure of vessel fuel costs, 
which has been collected from the oil company Statoil. Annual data on swordfish catch by 
oceanic region from FAO is used to represent available biomass. This is an important variable 
because a lower biomass will increase the fishermen’s search cost. Finally, we use wage 
indices collected from the various countries’ national statistical bureaus as a measure of wage 
costs.  As  demand  shifters,  we  use  wholesale  prices  for  two  major  swordfish-importing 
countries, Japan and Spain, in the importers currency. The wholesale prices are from the 
Tsukiji  market  in  Japan  and  Mercamadrid  market  in  Spain  and  were  obtained  from  the 
Norwegian  Seafood  Export  Council.  In  addition,  exchange  rates  are  used  between  the 
importing and the exporting country from Oanda.com. To identify the residual supply curve, 
imported quantity must be instrumented by variables that shift US demand. For this purpose 
we use US retail price of fresh swordfish from Urner Barry, swordfish catches in the US and 
the exchange rate between USD and the exporting country’s currency.     
 
Empirical results 
To test for market power exertion, we specify a residual supply schedule where the variables 
are  linear  in  logarithms,  and  consequently,  the  estimated  parameters  can  be  directly 
interpreted as elasticities. The model takes the following form: 
  lnwt = a + k qt + b Vt
s  + g Zt + et              (14) 
where  t e  is an iid error term, and  t  denotes time period (quarter). The variable wt is the 





s consists of exogenous variables shifting the supply of swordfish in the source 
country, the gasoil price, the wage rate and the total catch and Zt is a vector of wholesale 
prices  in  other  countries  that  are  alternative  markets  to  the  US  and  their  exchange  rates 
relatively to the exporter.
7,8 These alternative markets are Japan and Spain, the two largest 
importers of swordfish in the world besides the US.  
 
The  equations  are  estimated  with  a  GMM/IV  procedure,  and  since  autocorrelation  was  a 
problem, Newey–West standard errors are reported. The autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors and covariance are based on a Bartlett kernel with bandwidth two. We instrument the 
quantity with the retail sales price in the US, the exchange rate and lagged values of quantity 
and  retail  price.
9  We  tested  for  over-identification  using  the  Hansen  J-test,  and  the  test 
statistics suggest that over-identification is not a problem in any of the equations. In addition 
we calculate the statistics for the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test for 
under-identification.  The  Anderson  LR  test  determines  if  the  excluded  instruments  are 
relevant.  The  test  indicates  that  all  but  one  model  are  identified;  the  null  of  under-
identification is not rejected for Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
The results are reported in Table 2. The explanatory power of the models is quite good with 
the exception of Trinidad & Tobago where it is a low as 0.265. For the other countries the R
2 
varies from 0.741 to 0.977. Many of the exogenous variables are statistically significant at a 
5%  level,  and  in  all  equations  there  is  at  least  one  cost  and  one  demand  shifter  that  is 
statistically significant. 
                                                 
7 The total catch is in metric tones, and can as such be regarded as a fixed factor. This is because the stock will 
limit catches. 
8 For Costa Rica we were not able to obtain wages, and this variable is therefore missing for Costa Rica. 
9 We have also estimated the equation with a dummy for the Give Swordfish a Break campaign as an additional 





The key parameter of interest, the residual supply flexibility is reported in the fist row. As one 
can see, for Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay estimates are statistically significant, while they 
are not statistically significant for Brazil, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago. For the three 
countries were the elasticity is statistically significant, the magnitude is not very large as it 
varies between 0.072 and 0.142. That is, if one assumes consistent conjectures, the mark-
down is between 7.2% and 14.2%. Hence, US trade restrictions on imports from Chile, Costa 
Rica and Uruguay are likely to influence fishing practices. However, the effect is not likely to 
be very large. The magnitude for Trinidad and Tobago indicates a positive mark-down of 
about 7%, but it is not statistically significant. As the model for Trinidad and Tobago does 
perform poorly compared with the models for the other countries, the results are consequently 
not very reliable. Although the elasticity is statistically insignificant, it is there for difficult to 
make a clear conclusion with respect to Trinidad and Tobago. For Uruguay the magnitude is 
the highest, at 0.142, and trade restriction would be significantly more potent. Somewhat 
surprisingly, Mexico, the country with the closest proximity to the US is one of the two 
countries where the US does not seem to have market power. The significant effect of the 
Japanese and Spanish demand shifters appears to be the main reason, as these markets seem to 
be viable alternatives for Mexican exporters. For Brazil, the estimated parameter is negative, 
but basically zero. Hence, US trade measures are not likely to influence fishing practices in 
these two countries. The main reason for this is most likely the fact that the larger economies 
of Brazil and Mexico lead them to be better connected to other countries than the USA. As 






The  exploitation  of  oligopsony  power  has  become  an  increasingly  interesting  topic  in 
international trade as there is  an increasing use of trade measures to influence exporters’ 
behavior  or  production  techniques.  Trade  measures  are  imposed  against  other  countries 
because  their  production  practices  are  perceived  as  unacceptable  or  unfair.  This  includes 
measures  due  to  environmental  and  social  concerns  as  well  as  for  anti-dumping.  These 
measures have in common that their effect depends on the importers’ degree of market power. 
In particular, the measures will have no effect if the importer does not have market power, as 
the exporters hit by the regulations then just shift their exports to other markets. In this paper, 
we derive a residual supply schedule to investigate the degree of oligopsony power in an 
international  trade  context.  Using  this  approach,  one  can  test  whether  trade  restricting 
measures  against  an  industry  in  a  foreign  country  will  have  any  effect  before  they  are 
implemented.  
 
An empirical application is provided analyzing whether the US is in a position to affect the 
fishing  practices  of  swordfish  by  imposing  requirements  on  fishing  practices  of  their 
suppliers. The rationale is that if the US authorities wish to induce a change in fishermen’s 
behavior they must incur profit reductions of the swordfish exporters in the targeted country,. 
It is thus implied that the profit functions of exporters and fishermen are interrelated. For most 
swordfish  fisheries  this  will  be  a  realistic  assumption  as  the  prices  the  fishermen  obtain 
depend on those of the exporters. This trade issue was analyzed by estimating whether the US 
has oligopsonistic power as an importer of swordfish from six major exporters. We find that 
the US has market power in the swordfish import market for three of the six countries, and 
therefore  conclude  that  fishing  practice  requirements  imposed  by  the  US  on  suppliers  of 




may in some of the cases have the desired environmental effect, given that the effect on 
exporters’ profitability is sufficiently severe.  
 
Two issues that are of interest for further research, but which is not addressed here is the 
effect  of  limiting  the  imports  from  a  group  of  countries  simultaneously,  and  limiting  the 
imports  to  several  markets  simultaneously.  Both  measures  are  likely  to  increase  the 
effectiveness  of  the  trade  measures.  The  first,  implementing  similar  measures  on  several 
countries that are exporting to the US simultaneously is likely to be more efficient since it is 
likely to increase prices more for those who can access the market, and there may also be 
tougher competition in other markets as more fish are shipped there. The second, if the USA 
could coordinate measures with other swordfish importers such as the EU and Japan is also 
likely to increase the effectiveness of the measures, as it removes alternative markets for the 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Description    Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Q_Brazil    qus1  64  206126,3  133577,4  32519  499205 
Q_Chile    qus2  64  455481,9  542534  13040  2493222 
Q_Mexico    qus3  64  156535,4  116934,8  11237  656783 
Q_Costa Rica  qus4  64  85730,38  116808,8  0  565095 
Q_Trinidad y Tobago  qus6  64  48708,5  50356,79  0  275325 
Q_Uruguay    qus7  64  79517,11  86853,88  0  350603 
Q_Brazil    cbr  64  1990,5  626,0342  0  2778 
Catch_Chile    ccl  64  1723,5  785,4702  0  2976 
Catch_Mexico  cmx  64  2098,313  662,412  0  2913 
Catch_Trinidad y Tobago  ctt  64  809,25  269,7967  0  1149 
Catch_Uruguay  cuy  64  1990,5  626,0342  0  2778 
Catch_Costa Rica  ccr  64  2098,313  662,412  0  2913 
US retail price  pretail  64  4,780052  0,6039995  3  6 
w_Brazil    pus1  64  2,873542  0,365577  2,103333  3,763333 
w_Chile    pus2  64  7,14974  0,9670197  4,593333  9,08 
w_Mexico    pus3  64  4,62625  0,8921487  2,71  6,423333 
w_Costa Rica  pus4  43  6,729147  0,7691424  5,013333  8,39 
w_Trinidad y Tobago  pus6  44  7,173409  1,07324  4,69  8,913333 
w_Uruguay    pus7  44  5,035644  0,837086  2,93  6,52 
Wholesale price Spain  pes  55  5,876  1,171953  3,103333  8,913333 
Wholesale price Japan  pjp  44  6,785227  0,8961884  5,1  9,756667 
Gasoil price    gasoil  56  197,5465  62,32926  105,0433  432,4783 
usd_jpy    usd_jpy  64  0,0085285  0,0010406  0,0064397  0,0118533 
usd_eur    usd_eur  64  1,144491  0,1355446  0,8694413  1,385394 
usd_brl    usd_brl  41  0,588357  0,2553557  0,2749697  1,037494 
usd_clp    usd_clp  49  0,0019885  0,0003814  0,0013833  0,0026253 
usd_mxn    usd_mxn  57  0,1276487  0,0789024  0,0003207  0,3213643 
usd_crc    usd_crc  44  263,053  120,5279  0  443,61 
usd_ttd    usd_ttd  44  5,361601  1,978874  0  6,2524 
usd_uyu    usd_uyu  44  13,8773  8,2464  4,525933  29,72347 
wage_chile    wcl  48  117,4667  9,54044  97,2  132,6667 
wage_brazil    wbr  56  106,0363  6,723239  94,56667  119,9667 
wage_uruguay  wuy  56  117,6065  10,70501  96,36666  127,3 
wage_trinidad & tobago  wtt  40  106,1675  23,69034  45,7  137,9 




Table 2. Parameter estimates 






Quantity  -0.007  0.086  0.007  0.072  0.068  0.142 
  (0.12)  (4.16)**  (0.18)  (4.65)**  (1.04)  (2.32)* 
Price Spain  -0.138  -0.052  0.409  0.000  -0.451  -0.013 
  (1.36)  (0.55)  (5.23)**  (0.00)  (2.69)**  (0.21) 
EUR  0.776  0.433  -0.244  0.367  -0.052  1.098 
  (3.53)**  (1.51)  (1.63)  (3.23)**  (0.24)  (9.78)** 
Price Japan  0.092  -0.557  -0.001  0.092  0.169  -0.553 
  (0.47)  (3.51)**  (0.00)  (0.61)  (0.69)  (6.60)** 
JPY  -0.161  0.593  0.444  -0.015  -1.012  -0.178 
  (0.78)  (3.35)**  (2.61)**  (0.11)  (4.39)**  (1.34) 
Gasoil  0.405  0.236  0.015  0.204  0.290  0.196 
  (7.25)**  (3.83)**  -0.23  (4.31)**  (3.60)**  (4.25)** 
Wages  -1.466  -0.682  0.237    0.071  -0.929 
  (3.61)**  (0.95)  (2.70)**    (0.63)  (5.82)** 
Catch  0.355  -0.101  -0.071  0.222  -0.211  0.358 
  (2.81)**  (2.48)*  (0.98)  (2.91)**  (2.02)*  (3.38)** 
Q1  0.062  0.186  0.007  0.112  0.191  0.042 
  (1.38)  (2.90)**  (0.17)  (2.91)**  (2.02)*  (1.27) 
Q2  0.097  -0.034  -0.029  0.156  0.213  0.047 
  (2.51)*  (0.83)  (0.55)  (5.09)**  (3.58)**  (1.95) 
Q3  0.007  -0.093  0.168  0.036  0.043  0.041 
  (0.24)  (2.86)**  (3.35)**  (1.52)  (0.85)  (1.00) 
Constant  -0.007  0.086  0.007  0.072  0.068  0.142 
  (0.12)  (4.16)**  (0.18)  (4.65)**  (1.04)  (2.32)* 
R
2  0.9519  0.8627  0.8766  0.7409  0.2650  0.9774 
Anderson 
canon. Corr.† 
0.0078  0.0001  0.0081  0.0000  0.4125  0.0000 
Hansen J†   0.2587  0.8245  0.3948  0.1728  0.1502  0.2349 
Observations  35  35  35  35  35  35 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 






Figure 1. U.S. import prices for swordfish 
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